This article discusses what could be called “the adventure of translating” Sein und Zeit in Spanish. It argues that every translation is an adventure, and particularly the translation of a philosophical text. A translation does not literally reproduce into another language what an author or philosopher affirms. The question is instead to express it in the most accurate form with the resources of the translator’s language, in such a way that the text may sound as if it was written in (...) the language to which it is to be translated. This article refers to the very long route that the author had to go over in order to make Sein und Zeit “speak” a good and clear Spanish. (shrink)

Este texto se recomprende la noción escolástica de verdad como adecuatio intellectus et rei a la luz de la la interpretación heideggeriana como ¿develación¿. Para ello se siguen tres momentos al hilo de tres preguntas: ¿en qué consiste esta adecuación?, ¿en qué sentido el intelecto y la cosa pensda se parecen? y ¿cuál es la esencia de la verdad?

Este artículo examina la fenomenología que desarrolló el filósofo chileno Jorge Eduardo Rivera (1927-2017). Primeramente, se destacan algunas características generales de la filosofía de Rivera. Luego, se enjuicia la propuesta heideggeriana de un giro hermenéutico de la fenomenología husserliana que formula Rivera, fijándose especialmente en la interpretación ofrecida de Husserl y en otras posibilidades que ofrece la misma fenomenología. En tercer término, se muestra la concepción universitaria de la filosofía de Rivera, y su identificación (...) de los peligros que acechan a las universidades, sugiriéndose luego otras formas de amenazas universitarias actuales y otras alternativas fenomenológicas para concebir a la universidad contemporáneamente. (shrink)

Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

The ancient one-to-one relationship with the biological life cycle has gradually deteriorated due to the world undergoing a metamorphic process. Such a metamorphosis has affected ecological harmony, in terms of it being both an approach to studying the relationships between living beings and the environment, and a branch of knowledge protecting and promoting ecological balance. One of the crucial aspects of this phenomenon is the need to rethink and redefine the concept of life in an era that has been described (...) as the “Anthropocene”. In introducing this special issue of the Journal, the paper aims to investigate the environmental question, which plays a crucial role in contemporary political thought, due to the survival of both nature and mankind being threatened. Since the 1950s, such a complex situation has resulted in two lines of thought whose views follow two opposed ideologies – anthropocentrism and anti-anthropocentrism. (shrink)

El presente artículo presenta una línea de lectura desdefundamentos psicológicos, basados eminentemente en conceptualizaciones psicoanalíticas, para pensar, articular y fundamentar la educación socioemocional. Ofrece herramientas teóricas nodales, en relación con conceptos tales como el de “identificación”, el de “función tutorial”, el de “prójimo y el semejante”, entre otros, dando cuenta de la constitución psíco-socio-emocional del sujeto, en relación con su dependencia estructural respecto del Otro.

The objective of the communication is to analyze the characteristics of the training projects and their relationship with the development of collaborative work in Higher Education Institutions. As a study methodology, a documentary investigation was carried out, through the review and obtaining of information in various bibliographical sources. The results indicate that training projects are a strategy aimed at training people who, in a collaborative way and with the support of new technologies, are able to mobilize their knowledge in solving (...) their most pressing context problems, so they differ from traditional educational practices, in which knowledge are transmitted by the teacher in an academic manner. In conclusion, it is necessary to continue carrying out theoretical and empirical studies that enable the educational change required by the society of our time. (shrink)

Pourquoi s'interroger sur la possibilité de l'existence d'une philosophie au Chili? Voici la question traitée ici, en prenant comme axe le travail intellectuel du philosophe chilien Jorge Eduardo Rivera, décédé en janvier 2017, après l'écriture de cet ouvrage. Jorge Eduardo Rivera représente parfaitement le travail philosophique et universitaire. Celui qui se réalise dans le plus grand silence, hors de toute stridence ou de toute mode. Etranger au raffut des bavardages qui nous inonde. Une méditation (...) sobre, loin de toute bouffonnerie. Peut-être est-ce cela qui amena Rivera à décrire simplement et profondément des zones inconnues, éclairées par une parole qui, sans être poétique, nous renvoie à l'être en tant que tel et sous toutes ses formes. Ce livre présente l'exercice philosophique de Jorge Eduardo Rivera sous un horizon de réflexion à la fois propre et inspiré de la tradition européenne. Il expose sa biographie et son histoire intellectuelle, les différents espaces dans lesquels sa pensée s'est formée, depuis son noviciat et son scolasticat chez les Pères Français, jusqu'à ses études philosophiques et théologiques en Allemagne et ses rencontres avec Heidegger, Gadamer, Fink, Welte, Von Herrmann et Xavier Zubiri. (shrink)

The formula "being of beginning " is employed by Hegel to name the immediate non- determined being from which the beginning of science must take place. Beginning come together in it. Being and doing of beginning are one. To Hegel, this means that being is the only and factic response to the question about beginning. The being of beginning neither is nor represents itself by means of any principle, it is pure "determinetness". To Hegel, the task of depuration and action (...) of beginning constitutes the moment of consummation of philosophy. "Being", as a concept in itself, is set as pure sign void of signification. But in this lack of signification lies the "demand of signs". "Being of beginning" expresses being as pure sign. Lack and significance, considered up to now as negation and position of the being of beginning, are both consummated simultaneously and at the same time. Consummation of scepticism also carries nominalism with it. All words and representations may be emptied of significance and set to work in view of pure signification. But pure being may be considered, in the context of the Doctrine of Being, as the irreductible result of the proof of semiotic resistance carried out in the beginning. Scepticism consummates itself in beginning. "Being" is the only sign that signifies, even empty of significations; it is the only signifier in itself.La fórmula "ser del comienzo" es utilizada por Hegel para denominar al ser inmediato indeterminado a partir del cual debe ser hecho el comienzo de la ciencia. En ella convergen comienzo y ser. El ser y el hacer del comienzo son uno. Esto significa para Hegel que el ser es la única y fáctica respuesta a la pregunta por el comienzo. El ser del comienzo no es ni se representa mediante ningún principio, él es pura determinidad . La tarea de depuración y acción del comienzo constituye para Hegel el momento de consumación de la filosofía. "Ser" en tanto concepto en sí es puesto como signo puro vaciado de significación. Pero en esta carencia de significación radica la "demanda de signos". "Ser del comienzo" expresa al ser en tanto signo puro. Carencia y significación, considerados hasta aquí como negación y posición del ser del comienzo, se consuman ambos simultánea y conjuntamente. La consumación del escepticismo conlleva también del nominalismo. Todas las palabras o representaciones pueden ser vaciadas de significado y puestas en función de la pura significación. Pero el ser puro puede ser considerado, en el contexto de la Doctrina del ser, como el resultado irreductible de la prueba de resistencia semiótica efectuada por el comienzo. El escepticismo se consuma en el comienzo. "Ser" es el único signo que significa aún vacío de significados, es el único signo significante en sí. (shrink)

The questions inherent to the relationship between time and freedom reach their maturity in the works of Hegel and Schelling. In this article, we will attend particularly to the latter since the way opened by his "Investigations on the essence of human freedom" derives quite clearly into the successive attempts of exposition of a system of time in the "Ages of the World" and in the Lessons of München . Following Schelling's development, then, we will try to understand why in (...) the post-Kantian idealism the search for a philosophy of the spirit as a system of freedom leads to treat "time" not only as an a priori intuition of sensibility but as an inherent determination of the absolute, and in that sense, why in Schelling's thought system of freedom and system of time are equivalent to the exposition of the absolute.Las cuestiones inherentes a la relación entre tiempo y libertad alcanzan su madurez en las obras de Hegel y Schelling. En el presente artículo atenderemos de manera particular a este último, ya que el camino abierto por sus Investigaciones sobre la esencia de la libertad humana deriva con cierta claridad en los sucesivos intentos de exposición de un sistema del tiempo en las Edades del mundo y en las Lecciones de München . Siguiendo el desarrollo de Schelling, pues, intentaremos comprender por qué en el idealismo postkantiano la búsqueda de una filosofía del espíritu como sistema de la libertad conduce a tratar el "tiempo" ya no sólo como una intuición a priori de la sensibilidad sino como una determinación inherente al absoluto, y, en tal sentido, por qué en el pensamiento de Schelling sistema de la libertad y sistema del tiempo equivalen a la exposición del absoluto. (shrink)

The global market for biologics and biosimilar pharmaceutical products is experiencing rapid expansion, primarily driven by the continuous discovery of new molecules. However, information regarding Latin America’s biological market remains limited.

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual (...) homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia. (shrink)

“ Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. (...) But circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances. (shrink)

abstract The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to many of us. However, powerful arguments have been provided recently supporting legalisation (I consider two of those arguments: the Consequentialist Argument and the Autonomy Argument). Is our instinctive reaction against a market of organs irrational then? The aim of this paper is not to prove that legalization would be immoral, all things considered, but rather to show, first, that there are some kinds of (...) arguments, offered in favour of legalisation, that are, in an important sense, illegitimate, and second, that even if legalisation might not be wrong all things considered, there are good reasons for our negative moral intuitions. Moreover, identifying these reasons will help highlight some features of moral decisions in non‐ideal situations, which in turn might be relevant to some other moral or policy choices. (shrink)

Genetic research in human beings poses deep ethical problems, one being the problem of distributive justice. If we suppose that genetic technologies are able to produce visible benefits for the well being of people, and that these benefits are affordable to only a favored portion of society, then the consequence is obvious. We are introducing a new source of inequality. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to justify some concern for the distributive consequences of applying genetics to (...) human beings. This concern transcends a mere preoccupation for material equality. I argue that genetic inequality can undermine the very basis of social cooperation, at least regarding health care. The second section is more practical. My aim is to defend how, at least in some legal and cultural frameworks , the undesired distributive consequences of genetics are more likely to arise and more difficult to avoid. (shrink)

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the (...) so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless. (shrink)

Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be (...) excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered. (shrink)

In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to cases in which (only) (...) probabilities are different. After a brief defense of this claim, I conclude that some version of consequentialism seems more promising for offering a plausible solution to the probability case. (shrink)

The question I address in this paper is whether there is a version of mental state welfarism that can be coherent with the thesis that we have a legitimate concern for non‐experiential goals. If there is not, then we should reject mental state welfarism. My thesis is that there is such a version. My argument relies on the distinction between “reality‐centered desires” and “experience‐centered desires”. Mental state welfarism can accommodate our reality‐centered desires and our desire that they be objectively satisfied. (...) My general strategy is, at the level of the value theory, somewhat analogous to the strategy that indirect consequentialism applies at the level of moral obligation theory. To test my argument, I appeal to Nozick's well‐known example of the Experience Machine. (shrink)

We draw from upper echelons theory to investigate whether the presence of a chief sustainability officer (CSO) is associated with better corporate environmental performance in highly polluting industries. Such firms are under strong pressure to remediate environmental damage, to comply with regulations, and to even exceed environmental standards. CSOs in these firms are likely to be hired as legitimate agents to lead and successfully implement environmental strategy aimed at reducing pollution levels. Interestingly and contrary to our expectations, we found that (...) the presence of a CSO is associated with higher levels of pollution emissions. Nonetheless, we found that the CSO has a positive influence on a firm’s environmental performance if faced with strict environmental regulations. We argue that the enforcement of environmental regulations enhances monitoring and accountability of pollution emissions. The sample for this study comprised all the S&P 500 firms required by the Environmental Protection Agency to annually report their toxic emissions to the Toxic Release Inventory. Data were collected for a 6-year period from 2006 to 2011. We used a panel data regression and employed propensity score matching to correct for potential endogeneity problems. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent paper published in this journal, Thomas S. Petersen makes a qualified defense of what he calls ‘the Claim from Adoption’, according to which, ‘instead of expending resources on bringing new children [in developed countries] into the world using reproductive technology and caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children’. My purpose in this paper is not to discuss Petersen’s argument in favor of that claim. Rather, (...) I want to show that, even if the Claim from Adoption might be, other things being equal, true, it is not true all things considered. What is, all things considered, true is a much more complex set of statements, including a general prima facie obligation to adopt, as well as an obligation by the state of developed countries to discourage procreation and promote adoption of destitute children. (shrink)

We all agree on the justification of defending ourselves or others in some situations, but we do not often agree on why. Two main views compete: subjectivism and objectivism. The discussion has mainly been held in normative terms. But every theory must pass a previous test: logical consistency. It has recently been held that, at least in the case of defending others from aggression, objective theories lead, in some situations, to normative contradiction. My aim is to challenge the idea that (...) only objective theories have this uncomfortable feature. In fact, any plausible theory justifying the defense of others, whether subjectively or objectively, can lead to situations of normative inconsistency. Therefore, the logical test is not the most fitting one for choosing between different theories of private defense. (shrink)

El trabajo discute la justificación moral del uso de drones en conflictos armados, tanto desde el punto de vista de la moralidad profunda de la guerra como desde el punto de vista de cuál es la regulación jurídica moralmente justificable. Desde la óptica de la moralidad profunda, argumento que no es posible dar un veredicto general acerca de la permisión o prohibición moral del uso de drones. Desde la óptica de las convenciones jurídicas para regular los conflictos armados, sostengo que (...) la posición más razonable es la de una permisión fuertemente regulada, más que una prohibición absoluta. (shrink)

According to the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm, a person is so liable if and only if she acts in a way that provides sufficient evidence to justify a (putative) victim’s belief that the person poses a threat of unjust harm, which may or may not be the case. Bas van der Vossen defends this position by analyzing, in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s famous drug example, a case in which a putative murderer is killed by (...) a putative victim. Van der Vossen submits that the putative murderer is liable to be killed, which is a verdict that can be accommodated only by the evidence-relative view. We argue that Van der Vossen’s attempt to ground the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm fails. We also argue that this notion should be construed in fact-relative terms. This, however, does not mean that the notion of permissibility should necessarily also be understood in such a way in all possible cases. So, we explore whether the evidence-relative view of permissibility may be used in some contexts. (shrink)

La pregunta que exploro en este trabajo es si la injusticia social puede socavar la autoridad moral de la sociedad para castigar al que delinque. La respuesta a esta pregunta depende esencialmente de cuál sea la teoría justificatoria del castigo penal de la que se parte. Analizo diversas teorías de la pena, entre ellas la teoría consensual de Carlos Nino. Mi objetivo es explorar de qué modo las diferentes teorías de la pena enfrentan el desafío que plantea la pregunta y (...) extraer algunas conclusiones tentativas de ese recorrido. The question I address in this paper is whether social injustice can undermine the moral authority of society to punish criminals. The answer to this question crucially depends on the underlying justificatory theory of punishment. I consider several theories, among them the consensual theory proposed by Carlos Nino. My aim is to explore how different theories of punishment address the challenge and to draw some tentative conclusions. (shrink)

El trabajo analiza el tema de los derechos humanos bajo la perspectiva de la política multilateral. En esta línea, se concentra en las innovaciones que ha implicado el establecimiento del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, en lugar de la antigua Comisión de Derechos Humanos. Para tal efecto, se pone un énfasis especial en el estudio de las discusiones políticas que se dieron en el seno de la Comunidad Internacional, durante el proceso de constitución del nuevo Consejo, así como en los nuevos (...) mecanismos de revisión que éste contempla. (shrink)